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Introduction 
“Small states”, according to an oft-quoted volume, “enjoy more international prestige and visibility 
than at any other time in history”.1 At the same time foreign policy action space and strategic 
opportunities of small states vary more widely than at any time since the beginning of the modern 
states system. In contrast to nineteenth century Europe when the great powers met in concert to decide 
on the rules of the game,2 today “the international legal system legitimizes political units without 
regard to size”,3 but at the same time same time formal equality has been accompanied by a widening 
gap between what individual small states can and cannot do. 
This paper explores the strategic consequences of this gap. I argue that the strategic 
options of small states are dependent upon how much action space they are allowed by other states, 
in particular the great powers, in their close vicinity. To be sure, this is a classic insight of small state 
studies.4 However, as I will show in the following sections, it needs to be rediscovered as well as 
revised if we are to understand how and why the strategic opportunities and challenges of small states 
vary in the present world order. Using Georgia as an example, I argue that the strategic options of a 
small state in the contemporary world order depends upon whether it conducts its foreign policy in 
                                                             
1 A previous version of this paper benefitted from comments at the BISA @ 40 workshop ‘Non-Western Small States: 
What Agency in an Unequal World?’ at the Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association, London, 
June 16, 2015, and from a presentation at a research seminar at the University of Zagreb, November 16, 2015. In 
particular, I would like to thank Stefano Musco, Virginie Grzelczyk, Marie Gibert and two anonymous reviewers for 
comments on earlier drafts. 
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the shadow of postcolonial, modern or postmodern states. I discuss how this affects the strategic menu 
as well as the foreign policy dilemmas of small states. Georgia is seen as a ‘laboratory’ for exploring 
these issues as it is located between the post-modern EU to the West, the modern Russia to the North 
and the postcolonial Middle East and former Soviet Central Asian states to the South and the East. In 
addition, Georgia may be viewed as a state with postmodern, modern and postcolonial characteristics. 
The argument is organized into four main sections and a conclusion. The first section 
provides a brief overview of the scholarly debate on small states in international relations arguing 
that despite important advancements in our understanding of small states, there is a need for 
improving our understanding of how and why the conditions for small state strategy vary across the 
international system. The second section suggests one answer to this challenge by exploring the 
similarities and differences between modern, postmodern and postcolonial states and discussing the 
implications for small state strategy. The third section applies this framework to Georgian foreign 
policy. The fourth section discusses the limitations of the analytical approach of the paper and how 
these limitations may be amended by a stronger engagement with balance of threat theory before the 
paper is concluded. 
 
The security predicament of small states: from survival problem to influence problem? 
The study of small states in international relations traditionally focused on a fundamental puzzle: 
How and why do these states survive considering their limited capabilities and the anarchic structure 
of the international system leaving them, internationally, without a legitimate monopoly of violence 
for protection?5 Thus, the security predicament of small states has traditionally been viewed as a 
logical consequence of their limited capabilities and the vulnerabilities that follow. By definition they 
suffer from a ‘capability deficit’. Small states are typically defined by absolute (e.g. a threshold 
population of 5 million) or relative (e.g. ‘non-great powers’ scoring less than the most powerful states 
across a range of capabilities) criteria focusing on their (lack of) material capabilities. The capability 
deficit “has been viewed as a handicap to state action, and even state survival”,6 because their relative 
lack of power has given small states less influence over international events and a smaller margin of 
time and error and as a consequence left them concerned primarily with risks of military attack and 
economic vulnerability,7 and strategies aiming defensively at survival.8 
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This view of the small state subscribes – implicitly more often than explicitly – to a 
neorealist understanding of world politics, where states are regarded as ‘like units’ primarily aiming 
for survival and with variations in their ability to ensure survival reflecting primarily differences 
among them in material capabilities.9 Theoretically, this has led to the expectation that a combination 
of the anarchic structure of international system and the behavior of systemic great powers are the 
main drivers of small state foreign policy.10 As noted by Hey, “if there is one piece of conventional 
wisdom about how best to explain small state behavior, it is that the answer lies at the system level 
of analysis. That is, because of their relatively weak power base within the international system, small 
states will act in passive and reactive modes, rather than as proactive agents of international 
change.”11 To be sure, this literature makes an important contribution to our understanding of small 
states by pointing out that inequality in capabilities creates inequality in opportunities for survival 
and influence internationally. However, beyond this fundamental point it has little to tell us about the 
strategic opportunities and challenges available to small states. In particular, it suffers from two 
weaknesses. First, it overemphasizes the importance of conventional military threats to the territorial 
survival of many small states. Inside the Euro-Atlantic area most small states do not face a 
conventional threat to their territorial survival as they benefit from the protection from the world’s 
strongest military power, the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, France and Germany and 
membership of NATO and the EU. Outside the Euro-Atlantic area many small states face more 
dangerous threats from unconventional threats including insurgents or potential breakaway republics 
within their territory. Second, the focus on the system level means that this literature tends to overlook 
the importance of location and distance for small states. This is odd, because it is exactly the limited 
capabilities of small states, which lead them to focus on their close geopolitical vicinity as their 
chance of projecting power beyond that has traditionally been limited. In practice it has been 
developments in the geopolitical vicinity of the small state and the great powers situated nearby, 
which have most often put small state survival at risk.12 The system level approach is essentially a 
great power view of small states extrapolating the challenges and opportunities of great powers to the 
study of small states. For this reason it does not provide the tools us to detect and explain variations 
in strategic options among small states. As a consequence, the traditional system level approach 
leaves us with the puzzle it was seeking to explain: why and how do small states survive? 
This neorealist view of the small state in international relations is contrasted by a more 
recent perspective. Whereas the traditional approach focused on the challenges and limitations of 
being a small state, this approach focuses on the opportunities. Growing out of analyses of foreign 
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policy and cooperation and integration in Europe, this literature is less concerned with size defined 
by capabilities and more concerned with “perceptual size (how domestic and external actors regard 
the state)” or even “preference size (ambitions and prioritizations of the governing elite and its ideas 
about the international system)”.13 Whereas the traditional view of the small state in international 
affairs is based on an understanding of world politics consistent with neorealism, this view is closer 
to a constructivist understanding. Thus, it tends to emphasize how small states may influence or even 
alter the discursive structures of the European or global political space by acting as norm-
entrepreneurs setting a normative agenda and providing benchmarks within selected issue areas.14 It 
also argues that what we understand as ‘security’, foreign policy’ or ‘national interest’ may be more 
fluid than acknowledged in the traditional literature and therefore more moldable.15 Thus, small states 
survival and influence are not easily defined in a general and essentialist way, but in themselves the 
subject of negotiation. 
This literature has advanced our understanding of the strategic opportunities of small 
states by pointing to the importance of ideational constructs in international relations and diplomacy 
and how the lack of material capabilities may be balanced by norm-entrepreneurship thereby 
expanding the strategic opportunities of small states. Sometimes international relations is more like 
buffet than a set menu, even for small states. However, this approach suffers from two shortcomings. 
First, it tends to overemphasize the opportunities for small-state agenda setting, i.e. the equality 
between great powers and small states. This partly follows from the single or limited number case 
study methodology of many of the contributions to this body of literature and the ambition to 
challenge the conventional realist understanding of small states acting at the mercy of great powers. 
Thus, proving conventional wisdom wrong the literature does a good job showing when and how 
small states make a difference in world politics, but at the same time it suffers from a selection bias 
in its focus on the success stories of mainly North European states influencing issue areas that most 
often fall within the ‘low politics’ category. From this follows a second limitation: this literature tends 
to play down or even ignore the inequality among small states. By focusing overwhelmingly on small 
states in the Euro-Atlantic area, the obvious blind spot of the literature is the majority of states outside 
this area. This is unfortunate, because the resilience and vulnerability of small states vary widely as 
a consequence of their domestic political and economic differences and variations in geopolitical 
location and institutional membership.16 
In sum, these two contrasting perspectives provide us with valuable insights on the 
conditions for small state strategy but they also leave us with rather blunt instruments if we are to 
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explore the variations in strategic opportunities and challenges among small states and explain their 
individual strategic choices. They are not wrong, but they are underspecified. Thus, what we need is 
a systematization of sources of variation for strategic opportunities allowing us to specify the scope 
conditions for small state strategic choice. 
 
Variations in statehood and great power politics 
Sørensen’s ideal type categorization on the typical forms of statehood provides one such 
systematization.17 Sørensen identifies three ideal types of states – modern, postmodern and 
postcolonial - sharing four fundamental characteristics: a defined territory, an identifiable population, 
some form of government and constitutional independence.18 The four shared characteristics are what 
make these entities states. 
Beyond these characteristics, Sørensen identifies three ideal types. The modern state 
first emerged in Europe as it gradually overtook imperial types of organization as the main type of 
political entity in the region and from the twentieth century gradually spread to other parts of the 
world. This type of state is characterized by a legitimate monopoly on the legitimate use of force and 
a centralized system of rule including administrative, military and policing organization for upholding 
domestic order based on variations on the rule of law. It is characterized by a high level of community 
and cohesion and a strong correspondence between state and nation. Economically, the main sectors 
needed for reproduction and major parts of the economy are embedded in domestic society. The 
postcolonial state emerged as the European colonial empires were dissolved in the twentieth century. 
Domestic order is based on coercion rather than the rule of law as no legitimate monopoly of violence 
has been established and the institutional structures of the state are weak. There is a low sense of 
community inhibiting the development of democratic norms and institutions and economically it is 
typically dependent on the world market with strong dependence on a few export commodities and 
semi-feudal structures in agriculture. The postmodern state is mainly the product of intensified state 
cooperation in Europe after the Second World War induced by a combination of increased (uneven) 
globalization, comparatively weak European states in the Cold War superpower conflict, and political 
and economic pressure from the United States for cooperation among the region’s liberal democratic 
states. In postmodern states the domestic order is not as easily distinguished from the international 
order as in modern and postmodern states. Political and administrative governance is multilevel 
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spanning supranational, national and international institutions in various combinations, and this is 
also reflected in community and citizenship rights extending both above and below the national level 
and in the economy, which is to a large extent embedded in cross-border networks. 
These differences between different types of statehood are reflected in foreign policy. 
For the modern state traditional inter-state relations take primacy. Sovereignty is fixed and non-
negotiable, and the modern power is able to provide the basic political, administrative and economic 
infrastructure to uphold a viable domestic order and to protect this order from outside enemies by its 
national defence. Accordingly, the modern state deals in spheres of interest and reciprocity in 
interstate relations, and its main challenges and opportunities in international relations are the results 
of a struggle for power and security among states striving to maximize their interests in international 
anarchy – with military means if necessary.  
To the postmodern state, globalization - rather than an international anarchy populated 
by sovereign states – provides the starting point for its foreign policy.19 Globalization understood as 
“a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural 
integration of human and non-human activities” and therefore entailing increased political, economic 
and security interdependence and interconnectedness causing states to lose control over some 
domains at the same time as they gain control over others has two important consequences for foreign 
policy.20 First, the “playing field of politics” is transformed from a process primarily taking place 
within states to “a complex congeries of multilevel games played on multilayered institutional playing 
fields, above and across, as well as within, state boundaries. These games are played out by state 
actors, as well as market actors and cultural actors”.21 Second, as a consequence, territorial disputes 
are viewed as a nuisance to be avoided rather than a way to increase influence and power. Territorial 
gain is of little use to the postmodern state. In contrast it is likely to induce costs related to political 
unrest, migration and potential sanctions from the international society. 
The postcolonial state’s worldview exhibits some of the same characteristics as both the 
modern and the postmodern state. Like the modern state, it views international relations in terms of a 
power struggle among autonomous actors in an anarchic world, but like the postmodern state it does 
not view politics as tied to a territorial state holding a legitimate monopoly of violence. Rather a 
complex power struggle between many different kinds of actors is taking place inside and outside the 
state. The political elites of the postcolonial state are deeply dependent on the norms of international 
society for their survival, most importantly international recognition of sovereignty based on existing 
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borders. This recognition protects from external threats by entailing the principle of non-intervention 
and from domestic threats by constraining international support to the territorial claims of 
autonomy.22 It is as deeply embedded in and dependent upon the forces of globalization as the 
postmodern state, but whereas the postmodern state navigates between protecting autonomy and 
maximizing influence, the postcolonial state is mostly in the receiving end of globalization processes 
and seeks mainly to protect territorial integrity and survival by norms of sovereignty and preferential 
treatment. 
The strategies of small states are likely to fare dramatically different depending on 
whether the states they are dealing with are modern, postmodern or postcolonial. At the same time 
the ability of the small state to develop and implement strategies will also vary with its own type of 
statehood. As modern, postmodern and postcolonial types of statehood are ideal types, the process is 
further complicated as most states will exhibit characteristics of more than one type of statehood. The 
next section explores this problematique by discussing the extreme case of Georgia: a state located 
between modern, postmodern and postcolonial actors and at the same time sharing characteristics 
with all three types of statehood. 
 
Georgia between modern, postmodern and postcolonial worlds 
“Since ancient times the Caucasus areas has been a frontier and link between Europe and Asia, where 
cultures, empires and religions have met, fought or cooperated”, writes former European Parliament 
‘rapporteur’ Per Gahrton in his vivid account of Georgian politics and foreign relations.23 This is an 
even more accurate description of Georgia than of the rest of the Caucasus as Georgia views itself as 
Europe’s gateway to Asia and Asia’s gateway to Europe. Even more important, as noted above, 
Georgia is located between predominantly modern Russia, predominantly postmodern Europe and 
predominantly postcolonial Middle East and Central Asia.24 
Although occasionally characterized as the “postmodern face of Caucasus”,25 Georgia 
is more accurately described as a state combining the ideal type characteristics of the three types of 
statehood. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Georgia with some of the characteristics of a 
postcolonial state. Georgia bordered on collapse, and suspicion and insecurity came to dominate 
relations between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia resulting in “the emergence of a triangular 
struggle: Georgia fighting the Soviet Union for its national liberation; Moscow fighting the Georgian 
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drive for secession, leaders of autonomous Abkhazia and South Ossetia trying to defend their political 
rights against Georgian nationalism”.26 As a result Georgia became “the most contested state of the 
post-Soviet Southern Caucasus”.27 Also, as in many other postcolonial states, independence was the 
result of a nationalist uprising concentrating power in the hands of the president, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia.28 Gamsakhurdia was ousted in a coup in 1992, and replaced by former Soviet Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze. However, Gamsakhurdia’s supporters continued to present 
a threat to the survival of Shevardnadze’s political regime leading him engage in a delicate act of 
‘omnibalancing’ that came to characterize his presidency.29 First, by asking for the support of Russian 
troops to counter the continuing threat of Gamsakhurdia’s armed supporters and their strongholds in 
Western Georgia in exchange for Georgian membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), which Shevardnadze had initially been against, and later by engaging in a soft authoritarian 
“‘balancing of interests’, where former members of the Soviet elite were balanced against a faction 
of young reform-oriented liberals”30 with the effect of precluding the development of legitimate and 
effective political and administrative institutions. The elite driven pro-Western Rose Revolution 
ousting Shevardnadze in 2003 was at the same time a result of the rise of a pro-liberal NGO-rich civil 
society and a motor for the continued strengthening of this civil society in the first years after the 
revolution. At the same time corruption was reduced and the public sector made more efficient, and 
national defence strengthened through training programmes and economic support from the United 
States. Thus, the Georgian state began to exhibit the characteristics of modern statehood, although 
with the important qualification of a disputed territory. From the late 1980s, even before Georgia’s 
declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, Abkhazia and South Ossetia demanded 
independence and since late 1990, Tblisi has had little authority over the two republics.31 It is 
Georgia’s approach to the eventual solution of its territorial disputes over these two republics after 
the 2008 war – focusing on diplomatic and institutional solutions rather than a continuing military 
conflict - which has earned it the characterization as a postmodern state. However, the Georgian 
ambition to reintegrate the two republics into Georgia proper illustrates that Georgia continues to be 
closer to the modern ideal type, although in some respects a ‘would-be postmodern’. 
 
Facing the modern great power: Hiding or seeking shelter from Russia? 
Traditionally, the most fundamental problem of small states has been how to survive in the face of 
the overwhelming power and interests of nearby great powers. This is a problematique tied closely to 
9 
 
the modern great power dominating a sphere of interest in its geopolitical vicinity and using small 
states within this area as buffers against competing great powers. This leaves small states with two 
fundamental strategic options: ‘opt out’ of international relations by pursuing so-called hiding 
strategies of economic self-sufficiency and military neutrality and thereby reducing vulnerability, or 
seek protection from international relations by military and/or economic protection from one of the 
great powers by pursuing so-called shelter strategies of bilateral and multilateral alliances.32 Shelter 
strategies may take the form of either adapting to the policies of the threatening great power, i.e. 
bandwagoning, or by joining an opposing alliance, i.e. balancing.33 
For post-Soviet Georgia hiding was never a realistic option. The two pro-Russian 
breakaway republics South Ossetia and Abkhazia effectively excluded any attempts at hiding unless 
Georgia had been willing to give up territorial claims over the republics. Russia has continued to back 
the two breakaway republics financially and militarily. It did so in the two republics’ 2008 war with 
Georgia,34 and recently it tightened relations in the first months of 2015 by signing strategic alliances 
with both republics. Furthermore, Russia continues as the primary market for Georgian agricultural 
exports and the primary work destination for Georgian expats.35 In addition, by positioning itself 
politically as a ‘beacon of liberty’ spearheading not only US foreign policy interests but also serving 
as a model for the spread of liberal democracy and Western values and seeking to portray itself as a 
credible candidate for NATO membership,36 Georgia effectively ruled out any chance of hiding from 
the Russian great power even before the 2008 war. 
Shelter from the United States was at the same time a precondition for this foreign 
policy and an aspiration of the Georgian leadership. On the one hand, Georgia needed the financial 
and military backing of the United States in order to balance the threat from Russia. On US initiative, 
Georgia joined the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994 and was named a NATO ‘aspirant 
country’ in 2011. The US created the Train and Equipment Program in 2002 to “assist in the 
implementation of western standards in the Georgian armed forces”,37 and Georgian defence was 
significantly upgraded from 2004 to 2008. US assistance was vital for the procurement of e.g. battle 
tanks, drones, artillery and helicopters as well as training, aimed specifically to bring Georgian 
military capabilities up to par with NATO standards. On the other hand, the shelter strategy has, at 
least in the short to medium term, been without real effect on Georgian territorial defence at best, and 
counterproductive at worst.38 Georgia has no date set for NATO membership and is unlikely to get 
one until its territorial disputes with Russia are resolved. Unfortunately for Georgia, there is little 
prospect of ending these disputes as long as the result of a successful negotiation will be Georgian 
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NATO membership, thereby moving NATO firmly into the Russian sphere of interest in the post-
Soviet space and thereby challenging the modern great power’s sphere of interest. 
A shelter from the United States, however, is not the only option. Finding it impossible 
to ‘hide’ from Russia, because of the territorial disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and being 
denied an effective shelter by NATO, we should not be surprised that Russian interests have come to 
play a larger and more active role in Georgian society, including the Georgian political establishment 
since the 2008 war. A number of pro-liberal democracy Open Society foundations funded by George 
Soros was a significant source of financial support for reform-oriented liberals in the lead-up to the 
revolution and several senior government figures were recruited from Soros-financed NGOs, but only 
a few years after the revolution, in 2005, this resulted in an anti-Soros movement in Georgia protesting 
the Soros backed ‘Western’ influence on Georgian society. Despite continuing Russian occupation 
of 20 percent of Georgian territory, approximately a fifth of Georgians support membership of the 
Eurasian Union, a Russian-led alternative to the EU, and the share of voters finding that Georgia 
would benefit from abandoning Euro-Atlantic integration in favour of better relations with Russia 
rose from 20 percent in April 2014 to 27 percent in March 2016.39 Still, perceptions of Russian 
influence over Georgian society are still strongly negative. In a recent poll conducted by the US based 
National Democratic Institute, 80 percent of respondents agreed that Russia has a lot or some 
influence over Georgia and of those 76 percent found this to be negative, whereas only 12 percent 
saw it as positive.40 Despite this finding, Eurasianist groups are now more prominent in Georgian 
political life than they have been for a decade.41 Also, the ‘Georgian Dream’ coalition winning the 
parliamentary election in 2012 and the presidential election in 2013, while continuing to aim for 
Georgian membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions, has attempted normalization with Russia.42 
Small states choosing to support or follow a modern great power should be willing to 
engage in “a transactional social exchange in which they give and receive benefits”.43 However, as 
the Georgian case illustrates, the market value of these benefits are likely to vary with great power 
interests. Since the 2008-war Georgia has gained ‘market value’ for Russia as a successful example 
of the modern great power exercising what its leadership perceives to be its rights in the post-Soviet 
near-abroad. At the same time it has lost ‘market value’ for the United States as “Western quiescence 
in the face of Russian territorial aggression” is as much a result of a change in US foreign policy as 
it is a consequence of Russian policies.44 With a more narrow emphasis on the pragmatic 
advancement of US interests and less emphasis on the spread of democracy than during the 
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neoconservative Bush era, Georgia has less to offer as a ‘beacon of liberty’ for the United States and 
more value as a poster boy for Russian near abroad policies than before. 
 
Failing to bind the postmodern great power: Georgia as a (non-)European state 
The Georgian leadership views EU membership as complementary with its bid for NATO 
membership and in 2014 Georgia signed an Association Agreement with the EU, but the 2015 Riga 
summit “proved a major disappointment to partner countries Georgia and Moldova, as EU actions 
fell short of previous promises and still more so of the partners’ expectations.45 Thus, we should not 
be surprised that the EU has played a less prominent role than the United States in Georgian security, 
and no member state has taken on a role of ‘sponsor’ akin to the one played by the United States in 
NATO. In the aftermath of the 2008 war, the EU negotiated a peace agreement between Russia and 
Georgia, but rather than reflecting the postmodern nature of the EU or the interests of Georgia, its 
content seemed largely to accommodate Russian interests and offered no guarantees on when and 
how Russian troops would leave the Georgian territory leaving the EU’s effect on conflict settlement 
as “minimal at best”.46 The Georgian government, views their country as a bridge from West to East, 
an indisputably European county providing expert knowledge of how to manage relations with the 
Caucasus, the Middle East and beyond but itself belonging with the rest of Europe inside NATO and 
the EU. However, to EU decision-makers the ambiguity of Georgia’s status as ‘European’ and its 
unresolved internal security issues “forces upon European decision-makers a discussion about how 
far to the East the Union may be expanded, and how to balance between Europe's ideals about 
international society and its interests in cordial relations with Russia”.47 
The European Union is the political entity closest to an ideal type postmodern power in 
contemporary international relations. A postmodern great power rarely presents a conventional 
military threat. The complex political playing field of a globalized political space creates a fluid 
political environment, which necessitates means that goes beyond the traditional tools of statecraft, 
and it will most often attempt to “transform the interests, priorities, and expectations of its would be 
followers, and convince them to join the pursuit of ‘higher’ moral goals articulated by the leader”.48 
This represents less of a clear and present danger to small states than the modern great power’s threat 
of subjugation or invasion, but at the same time risks undermining the long term autonomy of the 
state. It is counterproductive (and becoming close to impossible) to hide from postmodern Europe, 
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and while sheltering might protect against outside enemies and threats, asymmetries within the shelter 
could create new ones. The typical small state strategy to offset these asymmetries is binding, 
attempting to ‘tame’ or at least to de-militarize power politics by binding the great powers through 
international treaties and institutions, even though they have fewer resources to do so than their great 
power counterparts.49 Not only are their official delegations typically smaller than those of the larger 
states, in addition they suffer from fewer lobbyists from domestic society and more limited access to 
technical and administrative expertise. Moreover, their small markets and limited military capabilities 
typically leave small states dependent upon successful international cooperation, and therefore facing 
a double asymmetry: they need a successful outcome of negotiations more than the great powers, but 
they are less able to influence the result of the negotiations than the great powers. 
Despite these challenges, small states within the European Union have achieved some 
success in binding the great powers in economic and non-military security affairs by working within 
the ‘European project’ defined by the great powers and contributing to European growth and order.50  
However, for small states in the margin of Europe, such as Georgia, binding is much more difficult. 
By way of enlargement, Georgia has become the EU’s geopolitical vicinity. The enlargement with 
Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 extended EU territory to the Black Sea intensifying EU engagement 
in the post-Soviet area, which had already been a result of Baltic EU membership and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) since 2004 stressing the “transformative power” of the EU through 
market access rather than military power.51 The postmodern great power’s view of territorial conflicts 
as nuisances with no winners and therefore to be avoided has resulted in external policies largely 
accommodating Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet space as military confrontation is not seen as a 
viable solution. Thus, the EU’s “Russia-first approach” toward the South Caucasus has continued 
from the 1990s until today and effectively results in little real prospect of moving beyond the current 
association agreement to full Georgian membership or influence on EU policies.52  
In combination with binding a number of European small states have sought to 
maximize their interests and influence by so-called smart state strategies. Rather than attempting to 
hide from, seek shelter from or bind the great powers, smart states focus their limited resources where 
they are likely to get the biggest return in terms of influence on issues on salient issues. They do this 
tapping into great power discourses by providing (part of) a solution to problems defined by the great 
powers as important and by taking on the role as mediators or norm-entrepreneurs providing a 
benchmark for future developments.53 After the Rose Revolution, Georgian policy-makers acted as 
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norm-entrepreneurs by self-consciously positioning their country as a liberal democratic Western 
style democracy in the Caucasus, and the successful elections of 2012 and 2013 and the acceptance 
of defeat by the ruling president further embedded Georgia in Euro-Atlantic liberal democratic 
discourse,54. However, although this has undoubtedly facilitated relations with the EU, other potential 
effects have been mitigated by the marginal importance of Georgia to Europe and the potential 
challenges to the EU associated with closer relations. Thus, whereas small states in EU-Europe 
navigates the dilemma between autonomy and influence in a continuing negotiation process among 
member states, Georgia is stuck in a situation with limits on its autonomy by the Russian influence 
over the two breakaway republics, and at the same time accepting a narrowing down of its action 
space by accommodating to the EU, but without much ability to influence either. 
  
Facing postcolonial instability: Back to the future with a vengeance? 
The postcolonial state represents a particularly tricky challenge for the small state. In contrast to the 
conventional challenges from great powers such as subjugation or invasion, the postcolonial state is 
typically too weak and too dependent upon external support from international society and/or 
particular great powers to pose a threat on its own. However, postcolonial instability may pose a 
threat of spilling over to neighbouring states and/or be used as a vehicle for great powers to expand 
or solidify their sphere of interest by claiming to legitimately stabilize postcolonial states. In that 
sense, a small state subject to postcolonial international relations is subject to the worst of two worlds: 
the unstable complexity of a postmodern globalized world with threats and challenges potentially 
emerging from many different actors located at different levels and in different parts of the world and 
the traditional great power politics of an anarchic state-based modern international system, but now 
with great powers more often claiming the right to interference in order to contain threats and 
challenges emerging from domestic disorders. 
As the Georgian case illustrates the problem is intensified if the small state itself shares 
a postcolonial past that may pose a serious threat to national security. Thus, the conflicts over South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia reflects the legacy of the Russian and Soviet empires. Abkhazia was annexed 
to Georgia in 1864, and thereby integrated into Russia as Russia had annexed the western Georgian 
kingdom of Imereti in 1810 and subsequently added several territories. Ossetians lived in Northern 
Georgia from the 17th century sharing Christian traditions and the experience of resisting 
Russification with Georgians but at the same time in a conflictual relationship with Georgia following 
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the advent of Georgian nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.55 In the Soviet 
Union South Ossetia was awarded the status of “autonomous district” following attempts to declare 
independence from Georgia,56 whereas Abkhazia was an “autonomous republic”.57 
At the same time instability in postcolonial states may represent an opportunity to 
cooperate more closely with a great power and thereby forge or strengthen the basis for a shelter 
strategy for the small state. Georgia has taken this opportunity in regard to both Russia and the United 
States since post-Soviet independence. Shortly after coming to power in the 2003 Rose Revolution, 
President Saakashvili identified “much closer, warmer and friendlier relations with the Russian 
Federation” as a main priority of his administration.58 One way of underpinning this closer 
relationship was to pursue a policy of crackdowns on Chechen separatists using Georgia as a safe 
haven, thereby helping the Russian great power with one of its security problems stemming from the 
now postcolonial Soviet empire. Meanwhile Russia contributed to the appeasement of Ajarian leader 
Aslan Abashidze by persuading him to resign and leave for Moscow rather than challenge the 
Georgian leadership and thereby helping Georgia with one of the challenges from its postcolonial 
legacy by allowing the Georgian leadership to omnibalance.59 In regard to the United States, 
Georgia’s relationship with the United States was strengthened by Georgian participation in the Iraq 
War (eventually growing to 2,000 troops, the third largest contribution to the Coalition of the 
Willing), thereby solidifying the US-Georgian relationship. Also, Georgia was one of the largest 
contributors outside NATO to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan,60 
and when ISAF ended in 2014 and was followed by the Resolute Support Mission from January 1, 
2015, Georgia was the number two contributor after the United States with 885 troops serving by 
May 2015.61 
Whereas these two examples show the potential for small state-great power cooperation 
in the face of postcolonial challenges, they also illustrate the potential shallowness of shelter strategies 
tied to this type of challenges. Georgian crackdown on Chechen insurgents may have helped forge 
the support of Russia in the face of Ajarian claims to independence, but it did not stop Russia from 
playing an active role in supporting Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence politically, 
economically and militarily and thereby de facto foreclosing Georgian membership of NATO and the 
EU for the foreseeable future. Georgian support for the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan may 
have served as an important vehicle for closer cooperation between the two countries, but it did not 
secure US military support when Georgia was invaded by Russia in August 2008 or prevent a US-
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Russian ‘reset’ of relations in March 2009, just over six months after the war. And by 2015, Georgia 
has no short-term, prospect of full NATO membership and no short term prospect of end to the 
Russian occupation. 
With hiding being impossible and shelter strategies proving impotent, Georgia seems 
to be stuck in two strategic dilemmas.62 In regard to Russia, Georgia navigates a dilemma between 
subjugation and obsolescence. On the one hand, if Georgia chooses to give into Russian pressure and 
give up parts of its autonomy (and territory), this may create the peace and stability as well as the 
undisputed borders necessary for membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions. However, this will signal 
Georgian subjugation and may be steps down a slippery slope of accepting ever more concessions to 
Russian interests thereby in the end undermining the prospects for Georgian membership of Euro-
Atlantic institutions. On the other hand, a steadfast rejection of Russian interests in Georgia and its 
breakaway republics is likely to make Georgian interests obsolete to the Russian government as they 
are unlikely to accept Georgian policies challenging the Russian perception of its sphere of interest. 
Thus, no matter which policy route the Georgian leadership follows, Georgia is likely to be stuck in 
the dilemma between subjugation and obsolescence with little chance of changing their strategic 
environment. The Georgian relationship with the United States seems to be of little help in this 
situation. In contrast, Georgia seems stuck in a related dilemma between goodwill and credibility. On 
the one hand, as a ‘would-be insider’ in regard to Euro-Atlantic institutions, and NATO in particular, 
Georgia needs to create goodwill among the Euro-Atlantic great powers, most importantly the United 
States. Georgia has done so with success and continues to do so by its active contributions to NATO-
led operations and cooperation with NATO and EU member states. On the other hand, these 
continuing contributions in spite of being left virtually alone with Russia during and after the 2008 
war risks undermining the credibility of Georgian claims to membership in return for showing that it 
is truly an actively contributing member of the Euro-Atlantic community. Georgia seems at the same 
time to be over-fulfilling the (not so explicit) requirements for inclusion in the West,63 and both unable 
and unwilling to deliver what is necessary for membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions: an end to the 
conflicts with the two breakaway republics and its territorial disputes with Russia. 
 




This paper has argued that the strategic options of small states are dependent upon how much action 
space they are allowed by other states, in particular the great powers, in their close vicinity and 
explored how Georgia’s strategic opportunities and challenges have varied in the shadow of modern, 
postmodern and postcolonial states with important consequences for Georgia’s strategic choice. At 
the same time, the analysis suffers from two limitations. First, whereas the statehood prism alerts our 
attention to a hirthero understudied aspect of small state foreign policy, it tells us very little about the 
general assumptions of international relations that may inform the application fo the prism for 
understanding foreign policy. Second, and related to this point, while resting on assumptions about 
power (a focus on how great power statehood affects small state strategic choice) and geopolitics (a 
focus on the geopolitical vicinity) these assumptions are left untheorized in the discussion above. 
How might we tackle these limitations? 
 One candidate solution is to integrate the statehood prism with Stephen Walt’s balance 
of threat theory.64 Balance of threat theory offers a sound grounding in realist assumptions about 
international relations that are compatible with the use of the statehood prism above: states are the 
primary actors, and they make their strategic choices conditioned on the incertainty about the 
capabilities and intentions of other actors created by the anarchic structure of the international system. 
At the same time balance of threat theory shares with the statehood prism the observation that it is 
not power itself that is threatening, but how it is used. As noted by Walt: ”power of other states can 
be either a liability or an asset, depending on where it is located, what it can do, and how it is used”.65 
Thus power is merely one element among others in a threat calculation that also includes perception 
of intent, the offence-defence balance and geographic proximity. Paradoxically, the Achilles Heel of 
balance of threat theory is its conceptualization of intentions. Walt notes that “[i]ntention, not power, 
is crucial” but refrains from unpacking or theorizing exactly how.66 The statehood prism may offer 
balance of threat theory this much needed conceptualization by providing a systematic and relatively 
simple template for analyzing intentions in terms of modern, postmodern and postcolonial views of 
international relations as explained and applied above. 
 This integrated balance of threat plus statehood approach may allow for a more 
systematic account of the role of power and geopolitics than the statehood prism and a more 
systematic integration of intentions in the analysis than balance of threat theory offers in its original 
formulation. As Georgia developed from a postcolonial state in the early 1990s to a modern state 
from the mid-1990s and a would-be postmodern state since the Rose Revolution this had decisive 
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effects on how it perceived the intentions of other states, but how these perceptions of intention are 
transmitted into policy decisions is dependent upon proximity and power that tell us which actors are 
decisive for Georgian security and survival, and to which extent they are able to project their power 
on Georgian territory. At the same time, the modern, postmodern or postcolonial character of these 




Small state foreign policy is formulated within a discursive space defined by great power politics. In 
turn, the nature and consequences of this space are conditioned upon the statehood of the great 
powers. Modern, postmodern and postcolonial states all seek to maximize their interests in 
international relations but they differ in how they define their interests and which means they see as 
legitimate and effective in pursuing them. Thus, even though Georgia’s foreign policy action space 
remains a function of its geopolitical location, we need to understand the statehood of Georgia as well 
as the states with interests in its geopolitical vicinity if we are to understand the nature of this action 
space and the challenges and opportunities of Georgian foreign policy,  
The ability of small states to manipulate or restrain the policies of the strong within this 
discursive space vary widely. As a ‘would-be insider’ to Euro-Atlantic institutions, Georgia had much 
less influence on European affairs than the insiders at the same time as it had to adapt its policies to 
signal its willingness and ability become an insider. To paraphrase George Orwell ‘all small states 
are equal but some small states are more equal than others’. Modern power politics continue to trump 
postmodern as well as postcolonial opportunities and challenges. Recent literature on small state 
strategy has emphasized ‘smart’ ways to maximize influence drawing on the experience of small EU 
member states. However, as illustrated by the Georgian case, postmodern rules of the game only 
apply within the confines of the postmodern political space. Georgia was first punished by Russia for 
being a US spearhead in the Caucasus and then ignored by a wounded post-Iraq War United States 
in its effort to reset relations with a resurgent Russia after the war. Even the postmodern European 
Union played the modern great power game largely adapting to the policies of Russia and leaving 
Georgia to its own devices, whenever there was a risk of open confrontation with Russia. For these 
reasons, Georgia’s future as a Euro-Atlantic country looks more bleak than one would believe when 
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listening to Georgian or Western decision-makers. Georgia is stuck between postmodern Europe, 
modern Russia and the postcolonial post-Soviet space, and there is little the country can do about it, 
although future policy choices may ameliorate the situation. No matter whether Georgia attempted to 
pursue shelter, binding or smart strategies by providing a democratic benchmark in the Caucasus, this 
failed to provide the expected entry ticket into Euro-Atlantic institutions as neither the EU nor the 
United States were willing to confront Russia over the issue. 
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